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ABSTRACT: This article reports results of a qualitative study that examined the leadership process 
during an organizational crisis in the Brazilian electrical sector. The studied organization is a company 
involved with the generation and distribution of electric energy, which faced a crisis because of the 
rupture of electricity-distribution cables that affected the energy supply chain for a whole city, during 
approximately 52 hours. In this context, the authors analyzed the crisis’ stages and the organizational 
crisis management phases, in order to identify the leadership tasks adopted by organizational lead-
ers during the crisis response. The major challenges brought with the crisis were identified and it was 
analyzed the leadership tasks used to address challenges: sensemaking, decision making, meaning 
making, terminating and learning.
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1. INTRODUCTION
During the past years, many scholars have conduct-
ed conceptual and empirical studies on the topic of 
organizational crises (Boin et al., 2005; Boin et al., 
2010; Hale, Dulek, & Hale, 2005; Hermann, 1963; 
Lagadec, 2009; Pearson & Clair, 1998; Pearson & 
Mitroff, 1993; Shrivastava, 1987; Smart & Vertinsky, 
1977; Weick, 1988; Weisæth, Knudsen Jr, & Tønnes-
sen, 2002). Firstly, Hermann (1963) identified that the 
occurrence of crises is frequent in the organizational 
quotidian, making possible the research of an im-
portant means of change in organizations: the crisis 
itself. Understandably, specialized research present-
ed different definitions and types of organizational 
crisis (Mitroff, 2004; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992). One 
definition affirms that “an organizational crisis is a 
low-probability, high-impact event that threatens 
the viability of the organization and is characterized 
by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolu-
tion” (Pearson & Clair, 1998). These unique features 
showed the importance of being prepared for orga-
nizational crises and introduced the study of crisis 
management (Fink, 1986). It can be defined as “a 
systematic attempt by organizational members with 
external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively 
manage those that do occur” (Pearson & Clair, 1998).
Recent studies proved that a crisis can strike a com-
pany that is not prepared for the constraints brought 
with it (Hart & Boin, 2001; Barton et al., 2015; Bazer-
man & Watkins, 2004; Boin & Gralepois, 2006; Boin 
& Rhinard, 2008; Kovoor-Misra, Zammuto, & Mitroff, 
2000). As pointed by Mitroff (2004), a crisis in one lo-
cale can swiftly escalate into a crisis for an entire or-
ganization, justifying the need for appropriate struc-
tures to focus on crisis management. Then, people in 
relevant corporate roles should be concerned with 
the prevention, response and recovery of crises. This 
reality corroborates with Smart and Vertinsky (1977). 
These authors suggest that key decisions in crises are 
often made by a small, tightly knit group of individu-
als. Besides, recent studies concluded that crisis and 
leadership are closely intertwined phenomena (Boin 
& Hart, 2003; Boin et al., 2005; Hannah et al., 2009; Mi-
troff, 2004). People in organizations experience crises 
as episodes of threat and uncertainty, that requires 
urgent action (Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort, 2001). 
In such distress, it is a natural inclination to look to 
leaders to “do something” and solve all the problems 
while the organization is stretched to its limits.
The literature about crisis and leadership suggests 
that times of crisis may significantly affect the rela-
tionship between leaders and followers (Halverson, 
Murphy, & Riggio, 2004; Hannah et al., 2009; Hunt, 
Boal, & Dodge, 1999; Pillai, 1996). Probably, the 
changes in this relationship is related to the fact that 
a crisis involves something new, which demands 
an ability to learn, as previously learned experience 
may come up short when the ordinary steady state 
of the organization is disrupted (Moynihan, 2009; 
Weisæth et al., 2002). Leadership researchers call this 
situation as the “disequilibrium dynamics”, when 
the current knowledge owned by the organization 
cannot solve the crisis’ constraints. In this way, or-
ganizational actors may mobilize to produce a new 
solution and promote the necessary adaptation for 
the company (Heifetz & Linsky, 2002; Heifetz, 1994; 
Heifetz, Grashow, & Linsky, 2009).
Besides, the leadership challenge of mobilizing peo-
ple during a crisis becomes even more difficult be-
cause the crisis stretches the company to the limits, 
while concepts of uncertainty and risk are very pres-
ent. Despite this situation, little attention has been 
paid in the literature to leadership processes during 
organizational response to crises and extreme con-
texts (Hannah et al., 2009; Silveira-dos-Santos, 2012). 
Mobilizing people during a crisis involve a lot of 
questions that are not being asked on the researches 
about crises. Although many papers focus attention 
on charismatic leadership in crisis situations (Beyer 
& Browning, 1999; Bligh, Kohles, & Meindl, 2004; 
Halverson et al., 2004; Pillai, 1996), the researchers 
do not pay particular attention to the leadership pro-
cess itself. While there are many approaches to crisis 
preparedness and the leaders’ charismatic behav-
ior (Fink, 1986; Halverson et al., 2004; Mitroff, 2004; 
Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992), there are few researches 
on how the leadership processes are developed. In 
fact, leadership processes required to react a crisis 
involve key aspects that are not taken into account, 
such as technical, organizational, cognitive and tem-
poral factors.
It is very important to understand the ability of or-
ganizational systems to maintain the desired levels 
of work when a crisis arrives. Will the organizational 
structure and process remain the same during the cri-
sis? Are the decisions taken with the needed speed? It 
is also important to understand how organizational 
leaders understand the crisis and how they commu-
nicate these meanings to all stakeholders. As the crisis 
involves new circumstances, a sensemaking process 
occurs (Weick, 1988;  Weick, 1995). So, it is important 
to investigate the leadership capabilities to manage 
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sensemaking processes. In the same way, the role and 
perception of time in organizations under extreme 
circumstances can change completely.
Driving the present study is the absence of pub-
lished research examining the questions above. As a 
first step into a better understanding of crisis leader-
ship processes, this study tries to focus on the lead-
ership challenges presented during organizational 
crisis response. It is at the response stage of a crisis 
that its characteristics of short decision time, com-
plexity and ambiguity surface (Bouillette & Quaran-
telli, 1971). Because of that, it is at the response stage 
that the leadership challenges are better represent-
ed. Nevertheless, empirical studies about leadership 
processes during extreme contexts are rare (Hannah 
et al., 2009; Silveira-dos-Santos, 2012). This paper’s 
aim, then, is to analyze an organizational crisis in 
the Brazilian Electrical Sector, focusing the leader-
ship challenges and identifying the crisis leadership 
tasks used to address each challenge.
With more than 8.5 million square kilometers and a 
great hydrographic basin, Brazil has one of the larg-
est energetic potential in the world. The installed ca-
pacity of the Brazilian energy matrix reached more 
than 141.680 MW on january 2016 (Brasil, 2016). 
These numbers demonstrate that the Brazilian Elec-
trical Sector is a large industry in the country, re-
flecting an important and strategic sector for the 
Brazilian Economy.
This study, then, is structured in four major sections. 
Firstly, the main theoretical background in organi-
zational crisis, crisis management and crisis leader-
ship are presented. After that, it is shown the meth-
odological assumptions that guided the research. 
Then, the main findings are presented, followed by 
a theoretical discussion to present the main contri-
butions of this study. 
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Crises come in many shapes and forms. Human 
conflicts, man-made accidents, economic problems 
or natural disasters shatter the natural order of so-
cieties and all of these events could be defined as 
crises. Fink (1986) affirms that a crisis is an unstable 
time or state of affairs in which a decisive change 
is impending, either one with the distinct possibil-
ity of a highly undesirable outcome, or one that can 
result with an extremely positive outcome. Never-
theless, the negative connotation of the word crisis 
often prevails and when a crisis occurs, people auto-
matically think that it arrives as a barrage of urgent, 
unexpected and unpleasant events, allowing little 
time to organize or plan appropriate responses, and 
making people and organizations to operate at their 
extreme. In this context, the organizational leaders’ 
behaviour and decisions will be decisive to the re-
sults achieved after the crisis period. At this section, 
the subjects of organizational crisis, crisis manage-
ment and crisis leadership will be explored.
2.1 Organizational Crisis
Any crisis that affects one or more organizations 
could be called an organizational crisis. For Pear-
son and Clair (1998), an organizational crisis is “a 
low-probability, high-impact event that threatens 
the viability of the organization and is characterized 
by ambiguity of cause, effect and means of resolu-
tion, as well as by a belief that decisions must be 
made swiftly”. This is a wide-ranging definition, 
which covers some common elements that are pres-
ent in different kinds of organizational crisis, like 
breakdown of key equipment, major plant disrup-
tion, product tampering, decline in major earnings, 
hostage taking, terrorism, natural disasters or other 
kinds of organizational crises.
Specifically, previous research has proved that or-
ganizational crises: (1) are highly ambiguous situa-
tions where causes and effects are unknown (Boin et 
al., 2005; Pearson, Roux-Dufort, & Clair, 2007; Quar-
antelli, 1988), creating a sensemaking process that 
is carried out while the crisis unrolls (Laere, 2013; 
Patriotta & Gruber, 2015; Weick, 1988); (2) have a 
low probability of occurring, although pose a major 
threat to the survival of an organization (Bazerman 
& Watkins, 2004; Roux-Dufort & Lalonde, 2013) and 
to organizational stakeholders (Alpaslan, Green, & 
Mitroff, 2009); (3) offer temporal constraints, giving 
little time for the leaders to make decisions and re-
spond to the crises (Boin & Smith, 2006; Shaw et al., 
2007); (4) disrupt the organizational status quo, pre-
senting a dilemma in need of decision that will result 
in change for better or worse (Fink, 1986; Sommer & 
Pearson, 2007); (5) change the existing relationships 
between leaders and followers, as the followers be-
come more easily influenced by their leaders under 
the crisis stress (Halverson et al., 2004).
This is, of course, an academic shortcut on the way 
toward understanding organizational crisis. Boin et 
al. (2005) show that, in real life, it is not always clear 
when exactly organizations experience a situation 
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in terms of crisis. Some situations seem crystal clear 
and others are clearly debatable. In this way, the def-
inition of a situation in terms of organizational cri-
sis is the outcome of a political process. Crises, then, 
are the result of multiple events, which interact over 
time to produce a threat with devastating potential. 
But this result will only be considered a crisis if or-
ganizational leaders and/or stakeholders perceive 
the threat and impute “meaning” to the unfolding 
crisis. Of course, the earlier one situation is identi-
fied and considered as a crisis, the higher are the 
chances to prevent the crisis threats (Mitroff, 2004).
a. Distinct phases of a crisis
If it is possible to draft a time continuum for a crisis, it 
would have, at least, three major phases: the incuba-
tion period (Turner, 1976), the critical period (Stein, 
2004) and the aftermath (Boin, McConnell, & Hart, 
2008). First of all, the incubation period, which can 
be also referred as the precrisis stage (Shrivastava, 
1987) or the prodomal crisis stage (Fink, 1986), cor-
responds to the period of time where the organiza-
tion is on its steady state and no danger or threats 
are identified. It corresponds to the organization’s 
ordinary state, with the normal structure and cur-
rent activities running on. Fink (1986) affirms that 
the prodromal stage is the warning stage, when the 
leaders should improve the organizational abilities 
to identify any kind of signal that can demonstrate 
the escalation of a crisis. Mitroff (2004) calls these 
abilities as “Signal Detection” and Weick & Sutcliffe 
(2001) call it “Mindfulness”. In this way, Fink (1986) 
says that it is easier to manage a crisis in the pro-
dromal stage, because if the organization is able to 
identify and act on the crisis escalation signals, the 
leaders have the opportunity to avert the crisis. It is 
also important to remember that if the leaders rec-
ognize these signals but are unable to dispose of it 
for whatever reason, just having a sense of what is 
about to happen will help the organization to pre-
pare for the critical period.
The critical period begins with the “precipitating 
event” (Turner, 1976) or “triggering event” (Shriv-
astava, 1987; Weick, 1988) that leads to the crisis. 
The triggering event marks the turning point (Fink, 
1986) and represents the onset of a qualitatively dif-
ferent period. Whereas the incubation period gener-
ally occurs over a lengthy period of months, years or 
even decades, the critical period is usually the much 
briefer time of the minutes, hours or days of the 
crisis itself. Fink (1986) call this phase as the acute 
crisis stage and it is usually the stage which most 
people have in mind when they speak of a crisis. 
If the prodromal phase alerts to the fact that a hot 
spot is brewing, the acute crisis phase tells that the 
worst has erupted. It is in this phase that the nega-
tive aspects of the crisis appears, all at once: (1) the 
information flows faster and intermittently (Boin et 
al., 2010; Smart & Vertinsky, 1977); (2) the options of 
communication channels reduce (Hale et al., 2005; 
Wester, 2009); (3) all the stakeholders became in-
volved (Acquier, Gang, & Szpirglas, 2008; Alpaslan 
et al., 2009; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993); (4) time is limit-
ed (Boin et al., 2010; Hannah et al., 2009); (5) decision 
making must be quick and effective (Santella, Stein-
berg, & Parks, 2009; Sommer & Pearson, 2007). One 
of the major difficulties in managing a crisis during 
this phase is the speed and intensity in which a se-
ries of constraints appear, leading the organization 
to the aftermath period.
Also known as the chronic crisis stage (Fink, 1986), 
the aftermath is a period of recovery, where the 
organization tries to respond to the constraints 
presented in the earlier stage. The chronic stage 
can linger indefinitely and it ends when the crisis 
is resolved. When the aftermath is over, organiza-
tions reached their new ordinary state, which can be 
equal or different to the steady state that prior to the 
crisis. Some authors say that the crisis cycle begins 
again and the organization reaches a new prodro-
mal stage, for future crises (Chekkar-Mansouri & 
Onnee, 2013; Elliott, 2009; Fink, 1986).
b. Crisis Management
Crises can happen in any kind of organizations and 
every crisis will cross the stages presented above. 
According to Fink (1986), sometimes all phases may 
occur within a very short space of time. At other 
times, there is an extended, long-fused prodrome 
stage. However, it is very important to identify the 
crisis signals in the incubation period, trying to avoid 
the occurrence of the triggering event or, at least, to 
prepare the organization for the critical period. It is 
important to remember that a crisis, like other orga-
nizational events, is a fluid, unstable, dynamic situ-
ation and the recurrent happenings are in a state of 
constant flux (Shepherd & Sutcliffe, 2015; Weick & 
Sutcliffe, 2001). In this context, the operative word is 
recognize. An organization must recognize any kind 
of evidence that can point to an unrolling crisis, in 
order to intervene proactively (Fink, 1986).
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That is the reason why Mitroff (2004) affirms that 
signal detection is at the heart of crisis manage-
ment. According to this author, all crises send out 
a trail of early warning signals. If these signals are 
picked up and acted upon, then a crisis can be pre-
vented in the precrisis stage, preserving the organi-
zation and the stakeholders. According to Mitroff 
(2004), early signal detection is vital because crises 
expand quickly. In the same idea, Weick and Sut-
cliffe (2001) demonstrates that the secret under the 
high rates of success of High Reliable Organiza-
tions (HROs) is their capacity to act mindfully, what 
means that HROs strive to maintain an underlying 
style of mental functioning that is distinguished by 
continuous updating and deepening of increasing-
ly plausible interpretations of what the organiza-
tional context is, what problems define it, and what 
remedies it contains.
These are the same practices recommended by cri-
sis management researchers (Boin et al., 2005; Fink, 
1986; Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992; Pearson et al., 2007; 
Roe & Schulman, 2008). According to Pearson & 
Clair (1998), organizational crisis management is a 
systematic attempt by organizational members with 
external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively 
manage those that do occur. Crisis management con-
sists of three distinct phases: crisis prevention, crisis 
response and recovery from the crisis (Fink, 1986). 
The crisis prevention occurs in the prodromal stage 
of the crisis, when the organization tries to iden-
tify crisis signals and act upon them with the aim 
to avert the crisis occurrence. The response stage is 
entered when avoidance efforts fail and events trig-
ger a crisis. At this point, organizations shift their 
resources and efforts to minimizing damage to the 
environment, the organization and the stakeholders. 
Then, the recovery stage involves attempts to learn 
from the event and implement the changes needed.
Traditionally, crisis management involves manage-
ment at staff level in a situation characterized by a 
critical period of time, in which leadership decisions 
will, for better or worse, determine the future of 
the organization (Barton et al., 2015; Weisæth et al., 
2002). In this way, organizational leaders have a spe-
cial responsibility to help safeguard the organization 
and its stakeholders from the adverse consequences 
of a crisis. Leaders who take this responsibility seri-
ously would have to concern with all crisis’ phases 
and with all crisis management’s stages (Boin et al., 
2005), as will be commented in the next section.
c. Crisis Leadership
Northouse (2007) affirms that leadership is a process 
whereby an individual influences a group of people 
to achieve a common goal. By this definition, it is 
implied that leadership is a process where a leader 
affects and is affected by followers. It emphasizes 
that leadership is not a linear, one-way event, but 
rather an interactive event, which would not happen 
without influence. Following the same ideas, Yukl 
(2006) says that leadership is the process of influ-
encing others to understand and agree about what 
needs to be done and how to do it, and the process 
of facilitating individual and collective efforts to ac-
complish shared objectives. After defining the term 
leadership, it is important to say that this paper will 
adopt the premise that any leadership attempt dur-
ing a crisis, in order to implement crisis manage-
ment practices, can be called crisis leadership.
According to Mitroff (2004), what characterizes cri-
sis leadership is the continuous responsibility to 
influence individuals in order to manage four key 
factors during all stages of a crisis. These factors are: 
(1) crisis types; (2) crisis mechanisms; (3) crisis sys-
tems; and (4) crisis stakeholders. For crisis types, it 
is understood the particular set of crises that an or-
ganization chooses to prepare. Then, crisis mecha-
nisms include early warning signals detection, dam-
age control systems and business recovery systems. 
The crisis systems covers the mechanisms by which 
a crisis unrolls and the crisis stakeholders are all of 
the various parties, institutions, and even societies, 
that affect and are affected by a major crisis. In this 
way, what differentiates crisis leadership from cri-
sis management is that the first recognizes the need 
to manage these four factors before, during and after 
a crisis, addressing these factors by the adoption of 
the crisis management practices (Mitroff, 2004).
Boin et al. (2005) define crisis leadership as the set 
of strategic tasks that encompasses all activities as-
sociated with the stages of crisis management. These 
authors defend that crisis leadership involves five 
critical tasks: sensemaking, decision making, mean-
ing making, terminating and learning.
Sensemaking means that organizational leaders 
must recognize from vague, ambivalent, and contra-
dictory signals that something out of the ordinary 
is developing. The critical nature of these develop-
ments is not self-evident and the leaders have to 
“make sense” of them (Boin et al., 2005; Patriotta & 
Gruber, 2015; Weick, 1988). In other words, this first 
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task means that leaders must appraise the threat and 
decide what the crisis is about. The second task of 
crisis leadership is decision making because crises 
bring various pressing issues to be addressed. In 
crisis circumstances, the situation remains unclear 
and volatile, shortening the time to think, consult 
and gain acceptance for decisions. In this way, crises 
force organizations to confront issues they do not 
face of a daily basis, involving tough value tradeoffs 
and presenting a challenge for leadership (Heifetz, 
1994; Heifetz et al., 2009). The next task is related to 
meaning making because a crisis generates a strong 
demand from stakeholders to know what is go-
ing on and to ascertain what they can do to protect 
their interests. In this context, leaders are expected 
to reduce uncertainty and provide an authoritative 
account of what is going on, why it is happening, 
and what needs to be done (Boin et al., 2005; Mait-
lis & Christianson, 2014; Maitlis, 2005). This means 
that, after the two previous tasks, when leaders 
have made sense of the events, arrived at some sort 
of situational appraisal and made some choices for 
action, they must get others to accept their definition 
of the situation, imputing “meaning” to the unfold-
ing crisis in such a way that their efforts to manage 
it are enhanced.
The first three tasks of crisis leadership are related 
to understanding and acting upon crisis constraints. 
After that, the next two tasks are related to finish-
ing the crisis and learning with it. In this way, the 
fourth task is terminating the crisis. According to 
Boin et al. (2005), a sense of normalcy will have to 
return sooner or later. So, it is a leadership task to 
make sure that this happens in a timely and expedi-
ent fashion. Crisis termination is two-fold because 
it is about shifting back from emergency to routine; 
and it requires some form of downsizing of crisis 
operations at the same time of rendering account 
for what has happened and gaining acceptance for 
this account (Fink, 1986). When this process is com-
pleted, the crisis has terminated and the ordinary 
state of the organization is back. After that, it is 
time for the fifth task, learning something with the 
crisis and making organizational lesson drawing. 
Of course, the crisis experience offers a reservoir 
of potential lessons for contingency planning and 
training for future crisis. In this way, as a crisis situ-
ation involves something new, it demands an abil-
ity to learn during and after the crisis as the previ-
ous learned experience may come up short (Boin et 
al., 2005; Deverell, Hansén, & Management, 2009; 
Elliott & Smith, 2007; Moynihan, 2009).
3. METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
As an initial investigation of leadership processes 
during an organizational crisis, this study was de-
signed to discover and organize concepts. A qualita-
tive research approach immersed the researchers in 
the data and encouraged their objectivity and open-
ness to new findings. The qualitative research is an 
effort to understand situations in their uniqueness 
as part of a particular context and its interactions. 
This understanding demonstrates that this kind of 
research does not attempt to predict what may hap-
pen in the future. Although, it aims to understand 
the nature of the studied phenomenon and its set-
tings – what it means for participants to be in that 
setting, what their meanings are, etc. (Merriam, 
1998). The same author explains that the qualitative 
research assumes that meaning is embedded in peo-
ple’s experience and that this meaning is mediated 
through the investigator’s own perceptions.
In such a way, the researcher is the primary instru-
ment for data collection and analysis, which creates 
the demand for the investigator to physically go to 
the organization in study (the fieldwork) and inter-
view its stakeholders (Merriam, 1998). So, the meth-
odological procedures of this research range the 
selection of an organization, interviewing its stake-
holders and the analysis of the interview’s transcrip-
tions, as follows.
a. Sample
In order to reach the research’s aims, the Brazilian 
Electrical Sector was selected because of its turbu-
lent context in the recent years, caused by several 
organizational crises, such as lack of energy for the 
industry demands, insufficient raining to mobilize 
the hydroelectric power stations and predictions 
of an electrical collapse in the recent future. In this 
context, it was selected a company involved with 
the generation and distribution of energy that has 
recently faced organizational crises. As the research 
was mainly conducted in the Brazilian state of Santa 
Catarina, and there is only one company allowed 
to distribute energy at that state, the company CE-
LESC S.A. was chosen to be studied. It is important 
to say that the company was formally consulted and 
agreed with this research.
After identifying the organization and with its ap-
proval for this study, the researchers listed the re-
cent crises in which the company was engaged. 
The criteria for chosing a crisis episode for study 
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were the following: (a) a crisis that reached at least 
50.000 consumer units; (b) was solved after at least 
48 hours; and (c) happened during the last 15 years, 
in order to make possible contacts with people that 
was directly involved in crisis response activities. 
As a result, 5 crises with big proportions were listed 
and one crisis was selected.
The chosen crisis was a blackout in the city of Flo-
rianópolis, capital of Santa Catarina state. The rup-
ture of one energy transmission line inside a bridge 
caused a huge power outage and the electricity sup-
ply was interrupted for the whole city, wich is an 
island, affecting more than 135.000 consumer units, 
for more than 55 hours. This crisis was unique be-
cause it affected an important city, capital of Santa 
Catarina state, for more than two days, bringing 
great constraints inside the company and for the 
whole community. It was the first time during the 
last 50 years that the city ran out of energy for more 
than 48 hours uninterruptedly.
The other 4 crises that were identified happened in 
smaller cities, which were not a state capital. Besides 
that, an important difference between them must be 
commented. The other 4 crises were related to nat-
ural phenomena, such as hurricanes, floodings or 
waterloggings. Because of that, the organization al-
ready had a protocol to respond to the crisis and the 
leaders pursued the response activities that should 
be conducted on those situations. On the other side, 
the Florianópolis’ blackout was caused by an infra-
structural collapse that the organization did not un-
derstand the reasons. Then, the leaders had to learn 
about the crisis and develop new mechanisms and 
leadership processes to solve the crisis.
This characteristic was favorable to this research’s 
design and the Florianópolis’ blackout was selected 
because of its dimensions, the need to grasp the cri-
sis until it unrolls and because it mobilized a great 
amount of employees to work on crisis response. So, 
the leadership processes would emerge naturally 
and could be explored with more emphasis.
After identifying the crisis that would be studied, 
the research participants were recruited and select-
ed to represent the leaders and followers involved 
in the crisis response. They were identified with a 
snowball sampling strategy and a total of 1 execu-
tive and 3 managers were selected. All of them were 
directly involved in the crisis response, in different 
hierarchical levels.
b. Data gathering
Data were gathered through extensive interviews 
with the research participants described above and 
through detailed reviews of secondary data sourc-
es. The use of interviews in the qualitative research 
is a justifiable and legitimate means of gathering 
information for additional insights and theory de-
velopment (Seidman, 1998; Spradley, 1979; Strauss 
& Corbin, 1998). This approach, its execution, and 
the drivers behind its use are consistent with argu-
ments that qualitative methods derive from a com-
bination of interpretivist sociological traditions 
and symbolic interacionism (Godoi, Bandeira-de-
Mello, & da Silva, 2006).
A multitude of organizational documents and re-
ports was consulted, and one researcher performed 
participant observation inside organizational rou-
tines for aproximately 6 months, in order to under-
stand organizational structure and culture. With this 
contact, the company’s Director of Operations, an 
executive position, was interviewed and indicated 
three managers that worked with him during the 
Florianópolis’ blackout episode. Three interviews 
were conducted with each informer, totalyzing 12 
formal and semistructured interviews, whith more 
than 600 minutes of dialogue. All interviews were 
recorded, transcribed and confronted with organi-
zational reports, local observations and media cov-
erage about the studied crises. All data was collected 
approximately four years after the crisis and all re-
spondents still work in the company.
c. Data analysis
Data analysis steps were conducted with the help of 
Atlas.ti software, in search for codes. Data coding fol-
lowed an inductive approach (Strauss & Corbin, 1998), 
with the codes emerging after data collection. All tran-
script elements related to the leadership processes dur-
ing the crisis response were assigned with a code. Each 
stage of codification was accompanied by empirical 
validation on data and happened in cycles until theo-
retical saturation was reached. Then, five core catego-
ries emerged from the data and were identified after 
data analysis processes, such as follows:
a) crisis constraints (kinds of problems caused by 
the crisis);
b) organizational structure (social coalitions 
designed to solve and communicate specific 
problems);
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c) cognitive factors (sensing and identifying 
problems, establishing priorities and learning 
mechanisms);
d) development of solutions (kinds of strategies cre-
ated to solve problems); and
e) motivation mechanisms (how the leaders moti-
vate their followers).
From this coding scheme, patterns emerged, which 
were validated and qualified across the crisis situ-
ations described in the interviews. The media cov-
erage for the studied crisis was also very important 
to validate the categories that resulted from data 
analysis. Figure 1 exemplifies the data analysis 
structure, showing the first order concepts identified 
during the interviews and the second order themes 
that emerged from the data and were considered the 
main categories for data analysis.
Figure 1: Example of data structure from concepts to themes









 “Our biggest problem was logistics. We worked with more 
than 500 people” (Respondent C). 
 “At that time, all cellphones ran out of battery. It was a 
problem because we had to walk to communicate. So, 
communication was a great problem” (Respondent B). 
 “Security was a question that bothered a lot” (Respondent C). 
 “We didn’t have a specific department to deal with that. Then, 
our Director became to call all the people that worked with 
transmission lines” (Respondent A). 
 “There wasn’t any contingency plan. This kind of problem 
was quite impossible to happen. But it unfortunately happened” 
(Respondent D). 
 “The groups were divided while people were arriving to help” 
(Respondent D). 
 “I was returning from lunch when the energy was interrupted. 
I was driving and all the traffic signals switched off. We didn’t 
know what was happening” (Respondent B). 
 “My secretary counted. I gave more than 100 interviews 
during one day and a half trying to explain the problem to the 
customers” (Respondent C). 
 “Then we figured out that the problem was on the bridge” 
(Respondent A). 
 “At the beginning of the night, we decided to build a new line, 
but we didn’t know how to do it” (Respondent A). 
 “The the ideas were coming ... what about an air line? No, it is 
impossible to cross the sea! And an engineer decided to walk 
through the bridge and figured out that the structure had some 
spaces that we could hang the isolators for the new line” 
(Respondent B). 
 “He did the project inside his head and we began to work” 
(Respondent B). 
 “I didn’t noticed lack of motivation. A man, to be on the top 
of a lamppost, at three o’clock in the morning, working for more 
than 15 hours, risking his life ...” (Respondent C). 
 “They did it because they respect the company, they are proud 
of our organization. Mainly the people we brought from other 
cities ... solving the problem was a matter of honour ...” 
(Respondent C). 
 “It was a kind of sinergy ... when anyone arrived and crossed 
the bridge to help us, a kind of energy was there ...” (Respondent 
B). 
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4. MAIN FINDINGS
Through the researchers’ immersion in the data (i.e., 
through repeated iteration between interview ses-
sions, fact finding in secondary literature sources, 
and data analysis), came a set of models used to de-
scribe how the leadership processes unfolded dur-
ing the examined organizational crisis. Below are 
brief descriptions of the research findings across the 
five categories that emerged in the data analysis.
a. Crisis Constraints
“[...] then we realized that it would take long. It 
was impossible to fix or restore it with all that 
fire in there. So, until we could fully under-
stand and realize what was going on, there was 
nothing to do. Let’s assume that, if only one of 
the lines had been reached, we would have some 
alternatives. But no, the two transmission lines 
were irreparably affected, they had no recovery. 
Something like that was quite impossible to 
happen. The city was without energy and we 
had no plan. Can you imagine what could hap-
pen?” (Respondent B).
Having in mind that the examined crisis caused 
the lack of energy in a whole town during approxi-
mately 52 hours, a set of problems arose during the 
crisis response. The leaders decided to build a new 
transmission line and restore the electricity supply 
chain and delivery in the city. During the creation of 
the new structure, a lot of constraints emerged and 
became a challenge to the leaders, as follows:
• Social Pressures: the inhabitants organized pro-
tests and sent communications to the media 
claiming for the electricity back in their homes;
• Security Problems: as the city had no electricity, 
some thieves tried to assault homes, shops and 
citizens;
• Time Restriction: the energy delivery had to be 
restored as quick as possible;
• Technical Restriction: build a new transmission 
line in a few hours was not easy. This kind of job, 
when done as usual, takes months. During cri-
sis response, the company needed to make it in a 
couple of days. As a result, a lot of technical prob-
lems arose, such as lack of the adequate equip-
ment or the absence of appropriate projects;
• Physical Restriction: as there was time restric-
tion, the employees worked more than 16 hours, 
uninterruptedly, in order to restore the energy 
delivery. As a result of the extreme work condi-
tions, the employees became tired, what could 
generate accidents; 
• Organizational Communication: as they had 
no energy in the whole city, communicating 
by phone or e-mail was impossible, once they 
could not charge their computers or cell phones 
during the new supply chain creation;
• Decision Making: the decision making process-
es to solve the crisis were very complex because 
the communication between executives, manag-
ers and operators was very difficult and the flow 
of information was slow and sporadic;
• Leadership Stress: as there were severe con-
straints during the crisis, and the leaders should 
deal with all of them, there were psycho-physio-
logical implications on them, bringing different 
emotions as the crisis unfolded.
b. Organizational Structure
“We didn’t have a contingency plan or a different 
structure to follow in cases like that ... to make these 
decisions, call this guy, call that guy ... we didn’t 
have that. After this episode, we made a contingency 
plan and we know exactly who should be called. But 
during that time, we didn’t have such structure.” 
(Informer A).
“And this decision was taken here, within this 
informal structure. Then they decided to call 
people, and they delegated a lot of things when 
a new person arrived there. For example, some-
one started to look for the needed items in the 
stocks, someone kept in touch with the guys 
who were designing the projects out there, on 
time, and so on.” (Informer D).
In order to consider all information about the crisis, 
the organizational structure has changed. Although 
the company had no crisis mobilization plan, a 
group of executives and managers was randomly 
structured to decide how the organization would 
respond to the crisis. The company stablished the 
address of an electricity substation that was near 
to the involved bridge as the Crisis Response Head 
Quarters and a lot of engineers went there to help 
the company. In this way, an informal coalition was 
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formed to make the strategic decisions. It is impor-
tant to say that two of the research informers made 
part of this small group of people that made impor-
tant decisions, such as the decision to build a new 
transmission line and the directions that this new 
line would have. Then, the new supply channel was 
divided in four parts, and it was randomly designed 
one manager for each part.
During the operational tasks to build the new trans-
mission line, the company respected the organiza-
tional formal structure of directors, managers and 
employees. So, the organizational structure was 
adapted to better respond to the crisis. The first en-
gineers that arrived at the Crisis Response Head 
Quarters formed a group to make strategic deci-
sions about the crisis and its response. Then, four 
engineers were designed to manage the services at 
different places. Each manager had employees that 
already work with transmission lines and they fol-
lowed power relations due to their formal position 
and hierarchy in the company.
c. Cognitive Factors
“This cable was different because it was an un-
derground facility, the only one that the com-
pany had at the time. It has a very small vul-
nerability exactly because it is under the bridge 
structure, so it is not susceptible to any kind 
of collision, it is not susceptible to anything, it 
is a quiet line there. So, it was completely un-
predictable and we didn’t believe it was hapen-
ing. We had to understand what caused the fire 
and the explosions and we had to learn how we 
could solve that ” (Informer A).
As the crisis unfolded, different people, either from 
the studied organizations or other institutions, con-
ducted the sense giving processes. When the subject 
was the new supply channel as a whole, the priori-
ties were established by the board of directors and 
the social coalition formed in the Crisis Response 
Head Quarters, near the locale of the cable rupture. 
On the other hand, when the problem sensing and 
identification was linked to one specific part of the 
supply chain that was being constructed, the sense 
giving was conducted by the specific manager re-
lated to the identified problem. This distinction on 
conducting the sense giving was not formalized and 
its equilibrium was found during the crisis, in an 
emergent manner.
d. Development of solutions
“The ideas that emerged ... well, let’s try to 
make an electric transmission airline,  because 
inside the bridge is not possible. And of course, 
first thing that comes to mind of an engineer, 
it is certainly impossible to do this, how do we 
make an airline, right, let’s assume that nor-
mal distances between the bridge towers, they 
oscillate between 200, 250, 180 meters on aver-
age. There, we have a 700 meters distance to 
connect lines.  For a conventional airline of 700 
meters, we would have to provide a structure 
of, at least, 100 meters of high on each side. 
Where we get that? Then the other idea, let’s 
try to make a line by another bridge, the oldest 
one. This idea did not progress due to the civil 
defense authorities ... ” (Informer B).
The company was not prepared for this kind of 
crisis and there was not any kind of plan to avert 
and respond to crises. As a result for this improper 
crisis management, without crisis prevention and 
signal detection, the vast majority of decisions and 
strategies created were emergent (Mintzberg, 1987), 
without any kind of previous deliberation. As the 
problems were identified, someone tried to create 
a possible solution until the constraint was solved. 
The needed knowledge to respond to the crisis was 
provided for a vast number of people and the solu-
tions were being made at the same time as the crisis 
was being unfolded. 
e. Motivation Mechanisms
“When people crossed the bridge and went 
over, a kind of energy was there, coming from 
... I don’t know why ... and the person had that 
spirit, it was built from ... what I see now, is that 
it was a very strong, interesting meaning, every-
one made a choice, I will be part of this story, 
but well, I’ll give my blood too. There was a guy 
here, who climbed a lamppost of those, he worked 
straight up there, we sent him a glass of water, 
apple, banana, he ate everything there and kept 
working.  The guy did not came down until he 
finished his job over there.” (Informer C).
The research participants revealed that the employ-
ees kept all the time motivated, in spite of the long 
work journeys, without being necessary any kind of 
motivation mechanisms, such as financial payments, 
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promotions or others. According to the informers, 
solving the crisis and restoring the energy delivery 
was a question of honour for the company and its 
employees. In this way, they kept motivated all the 
time, in order to restore the normality for the citi-
zens as soon as possible. As a result, the participants 
made clear that the company solved the problem 
and the employees became more united and friend-
ly to each other after the crisis.
5. DISCUSSION
In order to analyse the leadership process during the 
selected event, it is important to understand why the 
lack of electricity in the town was considered a crisis.
a. Crisis definition
It is important to perceive that all the crisis charac-
teristics were present in the studied case, as the cable 
rupture was a low probability event that brought 
high consequences for the organization and for a 
great number of external stakeholders, the citizens 
included. The situation brought with it a lot of con-
straints that imposed a severe pressure for quickly 
resolutions, as commented above, and gave great 
challenges for the organizational leaders. In accor-
dance with Boin et al. (2005), it was not clear that 
the crisis was unfolding and the organizational lead-
ers and stakeholders only perceived the threats af-
ter the occurrence of the triggering event, the cable 
rupture. Besides, the definition of the situation as a 
crisis was only decided after the whole city became 
out of energy. At this point, the organizational lead-
ers perceived the major problem, the power outage, 
and decided to randomly create a crisis group that 
got together near the rupture point to start the sen-
semaking process, discover the causes of the event 
and impute “meaning” to the unfolding crisis. The 
definition of the situation as a crisis was a political 
process (Boin et al., 2005), developed by the leaders 
and employees that were together in the Crisis Re-
sponse Head Quarters.
b. Crisis stages
About the crisis stages, the three major phases were 
evident. The precrisis stage (Fink, 1986) can be rep-
resented by the whole period of time prior to the ca-
ble rupture, in which no crisis signals were detected 
and no crisis prevention procedures existed. In this 
way, the organization did not act mindfully (Weick 
& Sutcliffe, 2001) and the incubation period of the 
crisis (Turner, 1976) was not recognized, as no cri-
sis signals were identified. So, the organization had 
no “signal detection mechanisms” (Mitroff, 2004) 
and had no abilities to identify any information that 
could demonstrate the critical stage of the existing 
electricity-distribution system and the escalation of 
the crisis. Maybe the crisis could be averted if the 
organization had such mechanisms.
The critical period (Stein, 2004) started with the trig-
gering event, the rupture of the cable rupture. This 
stage, also known as acute crisis stage (Fink, 1986), 
remained for the first 6 hours after the precipitating 
event. A lot of contingencies became relevant and, in 
accordance with Hale et al. (2005), the communica-
tion’s channels options reduced immediately after 
the cable rupture. At the same time, all stakehold-
ers, internal and external, became involved, in ac-
cordance with Pearson & Mitroff (1993), including 
the citizens and the media.  Because of the social 
problems, time became relevant and the decision 
making should be done as quick as possible. So, this 
stage existed for 6 hours, until the main decisions 
were made and the leaders agreed in the causes of 
the crisis and what should be done.
The chronic crisis stage (Fink, 1986) started when the 
leaders decided what to do and finished when the 
new transmission line was ready. This period, when 
the city was out of electricity, also can be considered 
the crisis aftermath (Garland, 1998).
c. Crisis Management
In the studied event, the majority of crisis manage-
ment practices were situated in the crisis response 
stage (Boin et al., 2010; Hale et al., 2005; Leidner, 
Pan, & Pan, 2009). The crisis prevention stage could 
not be observed, as the company had not any kind 
of plan to avert and respond to crises. Incubation 
processes thus remained latent and undiscovered. 
Although, the recovery from the crisis could be ob-
served as the participants mentioned the creation of 
a contingency plan after the crisis, in order to pre-
pare the organization for future crises. This means 
that the organization is trying to learn from the crisis 
and has developed a kind of “plan for action” for 
future problems.
This paper focused in the response stage because 
the majority of crisis leadership tasks were related 
to this crisis management phase. As the studied cri-
sis developed, a number of constraints appeared 
and the leaders should have focused their attention 
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to them. These unfolding circumstances were pre-
sented to the leaders as challenges to act upon. After 
the data analysis, five main categories emerged to 
link these, as shown in the figure 1.
In this way, the crisis leadership tasks assumed by 
the leaders were realized in order to address these 
five main challenges.
d. Crisis leadership
All the crisis leadership tasks presented by Boin et 
al. (2005) were present in this study. Sensemaking 
processes were necessary to understand the causes 
and the consequences of the electricity-distribution 
cables. In this occasion, leaders and employees that 
were together in the rupture point, after the trigger-
ing event, grasped the crisis as it unfolded. The sen-
semaking task took place at the same time that the 
decisions were being made. These two tasks, sense-
making and decision making, took place together 
and, as the crisis “sense” was being made, the leaders 
discussed the possible reactions to the crisis events, 
creating the decisions in an emergent manner. After 
deciding what to do, the meaning making task took 
place and the crisis explanations were distributed to 
internal and external stakeholders by the communi-
cation channels still available. Finally, when the crisis 
constraints were controlled and the organizational 
ordinary state was back, the terminating task ended 
and gave place to the learning task, when the organi-
zation started to make a contingency plan based on 
the lessons learned with the crisis.
Besides, it is important to comment that the follow-
ers were more easily influenced by their leaders dur-
ing the crisis, as the employees were more likely to 
acquiesce to their leaders and agreed to keep work-
ing for long periods. These results are in accordance 
with Halverson et al. (2004), whose work discussed 
that followers are more likely to acquiesce to their 
leaders under stress and are more receptive to in-
formation provided under stress. For this reason, it 
was not necessary to develop any kind of motiva-
tion mechanisms, such as financial payments, pro-
motions or others. According to the managers inter-
viewed, solving the crisis and restoring the energy 
delivery was a question of honour for the company 
and its employees. In this way, they kept motivated 
all the time, in order to restore the normality for the 
citizens as soon as possible. This fact demonstrates 
that the meaning making task was successful.
In the crisis context, the five crisis leadership tasks 
– sensemaking, decision making, meaning making, 
terminating and learning – were developed to ad-
dress the five leadership challenges that took place 
in the crisis response – crisis constraints, organiza-
tional structure, cognitive factors, development of 
solutions and motivation mechanisms – as summa-
rized in Table 1.
Table 1 – The crisis leadership tasks through the crisis response’s leadership challenges.
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Beyond the lack of electricity problem, the crisis 
brought a lot of constraints that the leaders had to 
respond immediately. The main problem, allied to 
these constraints, forced the leaders to practice all 
the five crisis leadership tasks together, for each 
constraint. In this way, for each separate problem, 
the leaders had to understand what was going on, 
decide what to do, convey the internal and exter-
nal stakeholders that it was the correct decision, act 
upon the problem and learn with it for the future. 
The leadership tasks related to the response to the 
crisis constraints took place during the critical pe-
riod stage and the chronic crisis stage.
f. Adapting the organizational structure
The crisis leadership tasks related to the organi-
zational structure were only two, decision making 
and meaning making. The first strategy adopted 
by the leaders was to randomly select some em-
ployees, forming a technical group to deal with 
the crisis. This decision divided the organizational 
structure for decision making in two: an informal 
structure for strategic decisions related to the cri-
sis and a formal one to deal with operational deci-
sions related to the construction of a new trans-
mission line. The leadership tasks related to the 
organizational structure took place only during 
the critical period.
g. Dealing with cognitive factors
Dealing with cognitive factors was at the heart 
of the crisis response. Creating a “meaning” to 
the crisis – sensemaking – and propagating this 
meaning through all the stakeholders – meaning 
making – were not easy tasks. It is interesting to 
remember that these two crisis leadership tasks 
were conducted by different people. When the 
subject was the new supply channel as a whole, 
the priorities were established by the board of di-
rectors and the social coalition formed near the lo-
cale of the cable rupture. On the other hand, when 
the problem sensing and identification was linked 
to one specific part of the supply chain that was 
being constructed, the sense giving was conduct-
ed by the specific manager related to the problem 
identified. The leadership tasks related to dealing 
with cognitive factors took place during the criti-
cal period and the chronic crisis stage.
h. Creating and developing solutions
The decision making task was always in the cen-
tre of the crisis response stage. Unfortunately, the 
company was not prepared for the crisis and it had 
not any kind of crisis management plans. Because 
of that, the decisions were taken so far as the sen-
semaking processes were developed. This is true 
for the major crisis, the lack of energy, and for the 
numerous crisis constraints that unfolded with the 
crisis. In this way, the vast majority of decisions and 
strategies created were emergent (Mintzberg, 1987). 
To address this leadership challenge, it was used the 
decision making task during the critical period and 
the chronic crisis stage. After the solution of the con-
straints, the leaders tried to learn with them in order 
to avoid similar problems in the future.
i. Developing motivation mechanisms 
To address this leadership challenge, the leaders 
used two crisis leadership tasks: meaning mak-
ing and terminating. By communicating the crisis 
“meaning” to the employees, the leaders could stim-
ulate a culture where restoring the energy delivery 
was a question of honour for the company and its 
employees. For each constraint that was resolved, 
the employees had become more united to resolve 
the other problems. So, disseminating the correct 
“meaning” and warranting the termination of the 
constraints were enough to keep the employees mo-
tivated, in spite of the long work journeys, without 
being necessary to create other motivation mecha-
nisms, such as financial payments or promotions. 
6. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
This paper analyzes an organizational crisis in the 
Brazilian Electrical Sector, focusing on the lead-
ership challenges during the crisis response and 
identifying the mechanisms used to mobilize peo-
ple and respond to the crisis. As a result, it was pos-
sible to identify that, prior the studied crisis, the 
company had not any kind of crisis management 
preoccupation. Then, the crisis got the organiza-
tion unprepared. Happily, the company responded 
successfully to the crisis, although in an improper 
manner. So, the importance of being prepared to an 
organizational crisis was demonstrated. Besides, it 
was documented the leadership challenges brought 
with crises and a five categories model was devel-
oped to analyze the crisis leadership tasks during 
the crisis response.
Unfortunately, the occurrence of crisis leadership 
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tasks during the crisis prevention stage could not 
be observed, as the organization had no signal de-
tection mechanisms to identify and avoid possible 
crises. In this way, the precrisis stage was not anal-
ysed. On the other hand, the critical period and the 
chronic crisis stage were observed and it was pos-
sible to analyse the crisis management’s response 
stage as a whole, focusing the leadership challenges 
presented by the crisis, such as the crisis leadership 
tasks used by the leaders to respond to the crisis and 
lead the organization back to its ordinary state. So, 
the leaders used the five crisis leadership tasks pre-
sented by Boin et al. (2005) – sense making, decision 
making, meaning making, terminating and learning 
– to address the challenges brought with the crisis. 
According to each challenge, the leaders used differ-
ent crisis leadership tasks, as summarized in table 1.
This study brings important theoretical contribu-
tions, as it corroborates with previous research on 
crisis management and crisis leadership, such as 
Smart & Vertinski (1977), Fink (1986), Pearson & Mi-
troff (1993), Halverson et al. (2004), Boin et al. (2005) 
and Hale et al. (2005), showing that: (1) key decisions 
were made by a small, tightly knit group of individu-
als; (2) all stakeholders, internal and external, became 
involved; (3) the communication’s channels options 
reduced immediately after the precipitating event; 
(4) the relationship between leader and followers has 
changed, as followers were more likely to acquiesce 
to their leaders under stress and were more receptive 
to information provided under stress; (5) the leaders 
used five crisis leadership tasks to respond to the cri-
sis; (6) it is more difficult to grasp and react to a cri-
sis after the critical period. Besides, it illustrates the 
leadership processes that were undertaken in order 
to respond to an organizational crisis.
On a practical basis, it was important to present a 
descriptive case study, which showed real prob-
lems, faced by an organization during the response 
of a huge crisis. The main categories that emerged 
from data are important to help other companies to 
plan crisis management systems and procedures. 
However, it is important to say that this study was 
restricted to observe one crisis episode. As a sugges-
tion for future research, other crisis events can be 
studied in order to validate these contributions and 
observe if the main categories of this research will 
also be present.
Finally, it was possible to observe practically the 
paradoxical nature of crisis (Nathan, 2000), as there 
were positive and negative outcomes to the stud-
ied event. In one hand, the negative aspects of the 
crisis were present because of the lack of energy in 
the whole town and with all the constraints brought 
with the crisis and already discussed in this paper. 
On the other hand, a very positive outcome was 
achieved, as the employees became more united and 
friendly to each other after the crisis. This fact dem-
onstrates that a crisis can have positive outcomes if 
the organizational leaders use the correct leadership 
tasks during the crisis response. In this way, facing a 
crisis situation may not be so bad if the organization 
is well prepared.
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